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WE SOME OF THE PEOPLE: AKHIL REED AMAR AND
THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Wythe Holt*
[T]he Leninist model [of working-class consciousness] and
that of the Commons/Perlman [progressive] school of labor
economists... have much in common .... [Bloth regard
the intellectual as playing a crucial role in changing the
workers' consciousness.'
We have a wonderful national ideology of popular rights and
popular freedom in the United States, one which has proved
useful, indeed inspirational, for ordinary folk since the Ameri-
can revolution and even before.' This ideology, however, does
not accurately reflect the actual facts of freedom and the pro-
* University Research Professor of Law, University of Alabama. BAL, 1963,
Amherst College; J.D., 1966, Ph.D., 1979, University of Virginia. My thanks go to
my Dean, Kenneth Randall, and to the University of Alabama School of Law which
has funded my research over many years, enabling me to be able to contribute this
essay to the project of critiquing Akhil Amar's book; and to my colleagues, Martha
Morgan and Norman Stein, for helpful comments.
This essay is dedicated to those who are writing the real constitutional history
of the working people of the United States, the labor law historians who include
Kenneth Casebeer, Gary Minda, James Gray Pope, Amy Dru Stanley, and Lea S.
VanderVelde. For some of their work, see LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND
CRITICAL ESSAYS 99-159, 231-59 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds.,
1992), and citations in other footnotes to this essay.
1. Bruce Nelson, "Pentecost" on the Pacific: Maritime Workers and Working-Class
Consciousness in the 1930s, in 4 POL. POWER & SOCIAL THEORY 141, 154 (1984). My
use of the term "progressive" to describe the attitudes and historical origins and con-
text of the CommonsfPerlman (I would say Commons/Brody/Dubofsky) school of labor
economics/historiography is taken from James Gray Pope, Labor's Constitution of Free-
dom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 945 passim (1997), where it is well contextualized and expli-
cated. I take it that Leninist vanguard theory is too well known in the academic
world to require citation.
2. See generally GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITI-
CAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1979); DAUGH-
TERS OF FREE MEN (American Social History Project film 1987); Lea S. VanderVelde,
The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1989); Nel-
son, supra note 1, at 165-72. I cite references here and elsewhere in this essay in the
chronological order of the events they portray, rather than according to the legalistic
and ahistorical rules of the "bluebook"
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tection of popular rights for most Americans; it is still only an
aspiration. For the elites who tend to be in positions of political
and economic power if not control the ideology is either disin-
genuous, an instrument of power, or subversive, depending on
the context.
We tell ourselves a story that we live in a democracy, where
we can all participate in our own governance, and where we
have fundamental rights-especially for dissenters, for minori-
ties, and for individuals beset by a strong government. And we
point to our Constitution and especially to its protection for the
writ of habeas corpus, the Bill of Rights, and the Reconstruc-
tion amendments as the principal proofs of the story.
The reality is that we do not live up to our ideals. And even
the progressives among the elites are taking notice. In this fin
de siecle era, progressives decry the tendency amongst laissez-
faire jurisprudes and federal judges to adopt paradoxically
statist, antidemocratic approaches to the Constitution and its
protections, and to advocate ever more pinched, often openly
and absurdly oppressive interpretations and applications of our
fundamental liberties. In one of the more persuasive and
thorough progressive attempts to redeem our ideological stories
of freedom, Akhil Reed Amar, a noted student of our constitu-
tional history, redirects our attention back to our ideals and
retells the story of the origins of both the Bill of Rights and the
Reconstruction amendments in a way designed to give elite
relief and to redress the balance, to move us away from statism
and laissez-faire and back towards apparent fulfillment of the
ideology of popular rights and popular freedom.4
Amar has apparently fine goals. The first half of the book is
intended to demonstrate that the original intent of the Bill of
Rights was to provide a meaningful response to the demands
made in 1787-89 by The People (or at least by the multitudi-
nous Anti-Federalist opponents of the original Constitution) for
structural restrictions against possible tyranny by the newly
centralized federal government. The second half shows that the
protections of minority rights and individual liberties for which
3. See Pope, supra note 1, at 945 passim.
4. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECON-
STRUCTION (1998).
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the Bill of Rights supposedly stands were actually effectuated
in 1866-68 by the original intention of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which (in Amar's shrewd and to me largely convincing
view)5 selectively incorporated those provisions of the first eight
or nine or ten amendments (plus other rights mentioned in the
body of the original Constitution) which are privileges of indi-
viduals rather than of states or of the public at large, as bul-
warks against tyranny. The People thus, in Amar's view, have
in the Bill of Rights, plus certain sections of the original Con-
stitution, both structural protections for majorities against op-
pression by the national government and protections for the
liberties of individuals and minorities against both national and
state governments.
Unfortunately, Amar's language as well as his history leave
it extremely ambiguous whether, for him, "The People" is an
all-inclusive category. As we have gotten further in time from
the American and French Revolutions-as the culture exuded
by industrial capitalism has come to dominate much of the
world and has absorbed or destroyed not only the varied and
often (if oddly) participatory premodern cultures of the Third
World, but also its own antecedent, the culture of the Enlight-
enment 6-as the vast atomized middle class is Taylorized,
browbeaten, and anesthetized into low-wage television-driven
stupefaction, and the even vaster underclass has any sense of
caring, belonging, or future pounded out of its heart-as
unredistributed wealth and as wealth disparities grow at amaz-
ing and, to me, alarming rates-the promise of democracy and
of popular self-governance portended by those Revolutions and
by the Enlightenment has faded.'
Progressives who seemingly promote democracy harbor grave
doubts at heart about the ability of The People to govern them-
selves. Instead of "self-governance," "management" has come to
5. Most of my own historical research concerns the Founding Era, not the Era of
Reconstruction, so I will leave to other historians the sharper critique of Amar's con-
stitutional history of the Reconstruction amendments.
6. General support for this proposition may be found in the assumptions and
arguments of postmodernism.
7. An arresting encapsulation of this change may be found in the story of the
change in the meaning of "police" in CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND
IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AmIumcAN REPUBLIC 35-97 (1993).
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be the primary paradigm of problem solution, and since the
1890s, progressive intellectuals have sought to control and man-
age democracy.8
By and large, progressives among American elites-whether
they admit it or not-have accepted the truth of Marx's postu-
late that capitalism is fundamentally characterized by a work-
ing class with socioeconomic interests diametrically opposed to
those of the propertied class. Imagining themselves not to be in
the working class, both in their patterns of thinking and in
their historical method they essentially ignore The real People,
ordinary everyday working folk. They praise democracy and
popular governance in the abstract, but the patterns of their
thought reveal an erasure of The People, a fundamental tenden-
cy to manage popular activity for The People's own good.9 As
the epigraph to this essay shows, this trait even characterizes
many modern Marxist elites.'1 By failing to imagine that ordi-
nary folks can actually think for themselves, such intellectuals
muffle the possibility of real change, of real democracy. While
Amar's book has many virtues, not least of which is a powerful
sense that in the United States the weak and the oppressed
should and do have rights, The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction shares this typical modern progressive trait.
Bowling over the proliferating and, to both Amar and myself,
dangerous and disgusting, narrow, statist theories of the Con-
stitution and its protections which cloud our intellectual hori-
zons these days, Amar exuberantly and boldly reasserts that
popular sovereignty is the basis of our government, a popular
sovereignty protected by a revived set of structural inhibitions
8. See generally, e.g., DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SO-
CIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971); Christopher L. Tomlins, A
Mysterious Power: Industrial Accidents and the Legal Construction of Employment
Relations in Massachusetts, 1800-1850, 6 LAw & HIST. REV. 375 (1988); Stephen A.
Marglin, What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist
Production, 6 REV. OF RADICAL POL. ECON. 33 (1974). This tendency has unfortunate-
ly not been confined to progressive liberals. See, e.g., EDWARD P. JOHANNINGSMEIER,
FORGING AMERICAN COMMUNISM: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM Z. FOSTER 59-89 (1994); NEL-
SON LICHTENSTEIN, THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN DETROIT: WALTER REUTHER AND
THE FATE OF AMERICAN LABOR (1995); Pope, supra note 1, at 950-52, 956-57.
9. A much more nuanced, contextualized, and sophisticated explication of this
observation (though not exemplified by the work of Amar), and one to which I am
greatly indebted, may be found in Pope, supra note 1, at 946-58 passim.
10. See supra note 8.
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against national tyranny as well as in a rejuvenated and possi-
bly enlarged plethora of protections for individuals and minori-
ties against state and national governmental overreaching.
Amar claims to have written "not just for lawyers and judges
but for ordinary citizens who care about our Constitution and
our rights."" His ebullient and often inspiring prose is meant
to brace us as it seemingly sanctions the right of popular in-
surgency as the last best assurance of government of, by, and
for The People.' I suspect that some of my fellow essayists in
this issue cheer and applaud.
An expectation of finding Amar next to oneself on the barri-
cades, however, would likely be disappointed. What Amar really
seems to mean by popular insurgency is quite genteel, to say
nothing of legalistic, orderly, and managed: "[T]he most obvious
and inalienable right underlying the Ninth Amendment is the
collective right of We the People to alter or abolish government,
through the distinctly American device of the constitutional
convention." 3 Redolent of the essentially Keynesian, top-down
bureaucratic managerial style of the leadership of the CIO, for
example, rather than of the open, jargonless but working-class-
based, bottom-up democractic alternative unionism that
Staughton Lynd and others have revealed to characterize much
of the popular insurgency wrought by many American working
folk during the awful crisis of the Great Depression,'4 Amar's
prose and assumptions do not leave much of a place for the
ability of regular folk to think and act for ourselves. His words
and approach to constitutional history seem to imagine, rather,
a benevolent management of The People by the (progressive)
intelligentsia. When his story is closely analyzed, The People
fade into Amar's background. Popular insurgency, peoples'
rights, a people-centered view of our history, government, and
destiny are not really reaffirmed. 5
11. AMAR, supra note 4, at 296.
12. See id. at 28, 47, 298-99.
13. Id. at 120.
14. See Staughton Lynd, Introduction to "WE ARE ALL LEADERS": THE ALTERNA-
TIVE UNIONISM OF THE EARLY 1930s 1-18 (Staughton Lynd ed., 1996). See generally
id. (other essays in the same volume); Nelson, supra note 1; Nelson Lichtenstein,
Auto Worker Militancy and the Structure of Factory Life, 1937-1955, 67 J. Am. HIST.
335 (1980).
15. Amar might protest that he talks of "the decades of bitter toil that ultimately
1999]
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For example, take Amar's explanation of what he is about.16
He begins with law teaching and moves to legal scholarship,
the real audiences for his work-and he stops there. All is in
the realm of elite ideology: nothing about popular understan-
ding or erroneous popular theories is contemplated. He asserts
that structural protection against government was "first in the
minds of those who framed the Bill of Rights"'T--it was not a
response to popular needs or popular actions, but only an idea
in elite minds. He focuses on what governments do, not what
The People did.
In his catalogue of "paradigm cases" giving rise to the Bill of
Rights-those "historical evil[s] that the drafting generation
lived through and sought to destroy with a text"'-he refers
to the actions colonial governments took to protect citizens from
Parliament and actions colonial legislatures took to oppose Brit-
ish evils, instances of official action important to the members
of the wealthy elites who controlled the Constitutional Conven-
tion. He ignores both popular participation in colonial govern-
ment and the American Revolution, 9 and popular insurgent
pressures such as Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia in the 1670s,"0
bore much fruit in the harvest" of Civil War and emancipation, and of "the disarming
of freedmen, the dragnet searches of black homes, [and] the Black Codes" which fol-
lowed emancipation, so that he at least has brought The People into the second half
of his story. AMAR, supra note 4, at 301. I am no expert on this period, so I will
again leave others to judge the worth of such a claim. For the present, I will grant
that his words describing the later period do seem more (if ambiguously) people-cen-
tered in this regard. I note, however, the following: (a) emancipation is over and done
with, and neither the First nor the Second Reconstructions seems to have actually
freed most people of color in any real economic sense; (b) slaves and ex-slaves are
always spoken of by Amar as people of color, not as workers, and Amar has no sense
that the failures of the two Reconstructions have anything to do with capitalism or
class repression; (c) the Civil War/emancipation/Reconstruction was an "insurgency"
led, completed, and limited by the government of the United States, not by blacks or
abolitionists or some other definable insurgent segment of The People; (d) the changes
Amar sees as having been wrought are entirely in the realm of ideology-legal rather
than social or socioeconomic changes; and (e) nothing in the changes Amar finds to
have been made in this later period was or is a challenge to capitalism.
16. See AMAR, supra note 4, at xi-xv.
17. Id. at xiii.
18. Id. at 301.
19. See generally NASH, supra note 2; STEVEN ROSSWURM, ARMS, COUNTRY, AND
CLASS: THE PHILADELPHIA MILITIA AND THE "LOWER SORT" DURING THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1987); ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 107-44
(1976).
20. Cf. EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE OR-
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the crowd actions which peppered the 1760s and 1770s,21 and
particularly the popular actions of the 1780s. These latter ac-
tions arose through the increased democracy installed in states'
revolutionary constitutions and consequent heavy voting, and
resulted variously in legislative action responsive to the new
voters to relieve debts and put more money into circulation,
challenges from popular conventions and associations of those
still dissatisfied, and the clash of arms and the burning of pub-
lic buildings to protest the pernicious effects of post-Revolution
depression and debilitating debt during the 1780s by those who
had lost faith in their governments.
Tellingly, Amar ignores the widespread resistance to the new
Constitution and government best reflected in the Whiskey
Rebellion (1 7 9 1-9 5 )' and finds his 1790s illustration of popu-
lar protest in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of
1798-legalistic protests of "legislators in these two states [who]
sounded the alarm when they saw the central government tak-
ing actions that they deemed dangerous and unconstitution-
al."' The world of Amar is confined to the elites who think,
understand, and move matters forward through the actions of
government, and does not include popular insurgents. The Peo-
ple are not present, not thinkers or actors, and so they must be
led by the hand and told what to do.
In a phrase,' Amar writes about "popular-sovereignty theo-
ry"' rather than popular sovereignty, and he does so legalisti-
cally rather than historically. Rights, for Amar, do not arise out
of popular activity and merit. They are brought into being in
DEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975).
21. See generally, e.g., DIRK HOERDER, CROWD ACTION IN REVOLUTIONARY MASSA-
CHUSETrs, 1765-1780 (1977); EDWARD COUNTRYMAN, A PEOPLE IN REVOLUTION: THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY IN NEW YORK, 1760-1790 (1981); THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN RADICALISM (Al-
fred F. Young ed., 1976).
22. See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, 259-345 (1950); DAVID P. SZATMARY, SItAYS'
REBELLION: THE MAMNG OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION (1980); Wythe Holt, "To
Establish Justice": Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Feder-
al Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1440-53.
23. See generally THOiAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER
EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986).
24. AMAR, supra note 4, at 5.
25. Id. at 225.
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the minds of elites and then enacted into law, where they re-
pose-elites and law mediating popular needs and, in fact,
acting to establish and protect them. Passing by important
exercises of popular sovereignty, Amar claims that our rights
"were broadened in the 1780s by American popular-sovereignty
theory" which, for example, "extended to ordinary citizens the
freedom of speech previously enjoyed only by legislators."26
This is crucial because Amar claims that he "seeks to realign
the dominant legal narrative about the Creation... with the
dominant historical narrative (as evidenced in history books
written about history by history professors)."27 The key word
here is "dominant"-both in the sense of "mainstream," and in
the sense of "top-down." When one searches his footnotes, one
finds that very few "history books written about history by
history professors" are actually cited, and that those cited are
overwhelmingly from the Whiggish mainstream school of ideal-
ist historiography, a group which notoriously focuses on elites,
elite activity, and elite words and theories, and which does not
practice materialist history or understand The People to be at
the center of history.'
For example, Gordon Wood, one of the most important of
Amar's sources, consistently views the events of the Founding
Period from the standpoint of the elites.29 "[T]he major consti-
tutional difficulty experienced in the Confederation period," he
says, was "the usurpation of private rights.""0 The exercise of
26. Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 302.
28. The overwhelming number of citations to secondary works in Amar's footnotes
dealing with the Founding Era are to law review articles, not to history articles or
books. Moreover, so far as I am able to judge, in the first six chapters only one sub-
stantive citation is made to a law review article written by an author who sees class
division and worker issues as fundamental, and who promotes and celebrates popular
action, popular governance, popular jurisgenesis, and popular constitutional activity.
See AMAR, supra note 4, at 322 n.37 (citing James Gray Pope, Republican Moments:
The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 287 (1990)). One of my own articles is cited, but only for attribution of a quote.
See id. at 339 n.42.
"Materialist" history deals with the material (socioeconomic) interactions of
humans and their material surroundings and circumstances, while "idealist" history
centers upon ideas and theory.
29. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 325-26, 394-95 (1969).
30. Id. at 412.
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popular sovereignty in the 1780s to redistribute wealth by re-
ducing or cancelling indebtedness-laws which Wood admits to
have been "enacted by legislatures which were probably as
equally and fairly representative of the people as any legisla-
tures in history"-was, he judges, "popular despotism."31
The solution the elites saw to what Wood calls "the vicious
state politics of the 1780's" was "to reverse the democratic ten-
dencies of the early [state] constitutions." 2 Then, when "[b]y
the middle eighties the whole of New England was beset by
[popular] conventions," western Massachusetts and portions of
Virginia were overcome by those whom Wood repeatedly terms
"Mobs" and "rioters," who rose "in spontaneous association,
burning courthouses and stopping tax collections."' Moreover,
he concludes, the real underlying problems "were not actually
the result of a scarcity of specie and the peculiar economic
problems of the 1780's" as the protesting populace and popular-
ly-controlled legislators kept saying that they were; "[tlhey were
rather a consequence and a symptom of the degenerate charac-
ter of the people."' The answer to this popular degeneracy
was, Wood finds, a new national Constitution. Federalists, "not
as much opposed to the governmental power of the states as to
the character of the people who were wielding it," wrote the
Constitution "to restore and to prolong the traditional kind of
elitist influence in politics that social developments, especially
since the Revolution, were undermining."" While this to me
seems almost transparently elite-serving, it is better history
than that of Amar, since it at least recognizes the existence of
popular activity.
Both Amar and the historians upon whose work he solely
relies for the Founding Era reject "the tradition of Charles
Beard ... [which] stresse[s] the importance of property protec-
tion in Federalist thought."" As is shown by modern studies
not so imbued with the elite perspective (even those which
concern ideas and theory), protection of property against the
31. Id. at 404, 413.
32. Id. at 485, 437.
33. Id. at 325-26.
34. Id. at 416.
35. Id. at 507, 513.
36. AMAR, supra note 4, at 78.
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kinds of redistributive onslaughts The People hurled against it
in the 1780s was the chief concern of the Federalist leaders at
the Constitutional Convention, especially for James Madison
who later drafted and sponsored the Bill of Rights.37 However,
Amar disagrees with the Beardian perspective except with re-
spect to Madison and asserts Madison's uniqueness: "Property
protection, it seems, was more
of his contemporaries."" The
idealist history, focusing upon
to deflect attention from the
desires and insurgent actions
them.39
central to Madison than to some
effect, if not the overt goal, of
the words and ideas of elites, is
property-oriented, redistributive
of The People, not to celebrate
37. See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990);
STAUGHTON LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
(1967). See also JOSEPH A. ERNST, MONEY AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 1755-1775
(1973); Marc Egnal & Joseph A. Ernst, An Economic Interpretation of the American
Revolution, 29 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 3 (1972); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 (1977). Amar cites none of the materialist
historians I have cited, except for James Gray Pope and Eric Foner, and their work,
so far as I can tell, is uniformly used by Amar for nonmaterialistic purposes. See
AMAR, supra note 4, at 302 (providing Amar's back-of-the-hand dismissal of historians
who find property to have been an important pivot of American constitutionalism,
without so much as an argument). This clinches, for me, the ahistorical and
antireformist nature of Amar's progressive message.
As the Israeli constitutional experience shows, the overriding purpose of all
modern constitutions is to provide protection for private property. Israel has been
adopting its constitution piecemeal since independence in 1948; it has put in place
many provisions protecting property and privilege, but has balked at and come to
impasse concerning provisions analogous to our Bill of Rights, failing to adopt rights
for the poor, for the elderly, for workers, for anyone other than the rich and property
owners. See Guy Mundlak, Professor of Law, Haifa University, Israel, Address at the
Fourth Conference of the International Network for Transformative Employment and
Labour Law, Cape Town (Mar. 19, 1999).
38. AMAR, supra note 4, at 79.
39. Amar makes only one passing reference to the importance of debt issues in
the Founding Period, and that is to "diversity cases pitting creditor-state plaintiffs
against debtor-state defendants." Id. at 91 (emphasis added). No citation is given to a
discussion of such cases. Amar ignores research on the importance of debt cases and
of alienage and diversity suits by creditors no matter what nation or state they were
from. See Holt, supra note 22, at 1442, 1449-58; Wythe Holt & James R. Perry, Writs
and Rights, "clashings and animosities": The First Confrontation Between Federal and
State Jurisdictions, 7 LAw & HIST. REV. 89 (1989). Amar essentially ignores the
problems of indebted states and the flood of suits by creditors. "Domestic creditors
pressed, sued, and jailed their debtors with an enthusiasm rivaled by the most
hardbitten of their British counterparts." Holt, supra note 22, at 1453. Amar also
ignores the widespread protections state legislatures often adopted favoring debtors
and causing the leading lights at the Constitutional Convention to demand that
386
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The popular protests of the 1780s had significant effect upon
the Bill of Rights-indeed, were its chief raison d'etre. Yet
Amar's discussion ignores this effect while discussing elite is-
sues of British troop-quartering in colonial homes before the
Revolution, the Zenger free-speech case of the early 1700s, the
"protection of various intermediate associations-church, militia,
and jury-designed to create an educated and virtuous elector-
ate,"' and other issues of concern to American elites. Fear of
popular uprising provoked if it did not directly lead to the Con-
stitutional Convention, in turn provoking as its product many
new national powers and prohibitions against the states. The
Constitution was written to protect a minority, all right: the
propertied. Upon learning of its provisions, The People, led
primarily by dissident members of the elite, threatened to reject
the new centralized governmental edifice and dominated many
of the state conventions called to ratify-a domination which
Amar significantly downplays.4' While the Federalists ulti-
mately prevailed in a hard-fought struggle, the Anti-Federalists
were probably more numerous than the Federalists, could have
prevented ratification, and forced several state conventions to
propose many amendments to the new governmental structure.
A Federalist-dominated First Congress did not wish to make
any concessions to The defeated People. Led by an eloquent
James Madison, however, who had promised during his election
states be prohibited from "coin[ing] Money; emit[ting] Bills of Credit; mak[ing] any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; [or] pass[ing] any . . .
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. It must be
noted that Gordon Wood also ignores this issue. See WOOD, supra note 29, at 418.
40. MAR, supra note 4, at xii (emphasis added).
41. See id. at 204. Amar notes the initial Anti-Federalist majority in four state
conventions, but he ignores Anti-Federalist initial dominance in New Hampshire and
the possibly underhanded methods of securing ratification there; he ignores the possi-
ble Anti-Federalist majority in the Pennsylvania convention and the overtly tyrannous
measures taken against it by the Federalist delegates; he ignores the failure of many
Anti-Federalist towns in Massachusetts to send delegates because of financ-
es-delegates who might have ensured defeat of the Constitution there; he ignores
Anti-Federalist control of a seventh state, Rhode Island; he ignores the fact that
rejection of the Constitution by any three of the four giant states with likely or possi-
ble Anti-Federalist majorities in their conventions (Virginia, Massachusetts, New York,
and Pennsylvania) would have defeated the Constitution by default since their joining
was economically and politically necessary for the nation to continue; and finally, he
ignores the fact that rejection by any five of the thirteen states would have scuttled
the Constitution by its own terms. See Holt, supra note 22, at 1475,-76.
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campaign to bring forward amendments, and who realized how
shaky and dubious the ratification actually was, Congress very
reluctantly complied. Its Federalist majority watered down the
Anti-Federalist demands, and sent to the states for ratification
what they considered to be a set of sops to the relatively harm-
less demands of Anti-Federalist sentiment for guarantees of
certain traditional rights-as Madison said, "limited to points
which are important in the eyes of many and can be objection-
able in those of none. The structure & stamina of the Govt. are
as little touched as possible."42 It worked, as soft Anti-Feder-
alist fears were mollified, or as in the case of some wealthy or
upwardly-mobile Anti-Federalist leaders like Samuel Chase of
Maryland, Willie Jones of North Carolina, and Patrick Henry
and Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, soft Anti-Federalists were
converted to Federalism, so that the threat of internal dissen-
sion was greatly lessened and seemed, for a while, to disap-
pear.'
Along with rejection of other Anti-Federalist clamors, Feder-
alists refused in what has come to be known as the Bill of
Rights to limit federal court jurisdiction over cases dealing with
debt. In the only real structural change made, Congress put
forward the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of civil jury
trials.' Under common law rules at the time, juries awarded
damages as judgments in debt suits, and had recently demon-
strated themselves to be quite reluctant to render adequate
verdicts for creditor plaintiffs; so the original Constitution had
not guaranteed jury trials in civil suits and, in addition, had
mandated United States Supreme Court "appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact," to allow revisory control over state
court juries.45 In a chapter remarkable for its able and convin-
cing argument about the jury as a kind of "popular representa-
42. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in 12 PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON 219 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson eds., 1979); see also Holt, su-
pra note 22, at 1476-78 & nn.202, 206; id. at 1513-15 & nn.341, 342 & 346.
43. Protests by lower-class Anti-Federalists soon resumed. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
44. See Holt, supra note 22, at 1514-15.
45. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; see also Holt, supra note 22, at 1468-69 &
nn.175-76. See generally Holt & Perry, supra note 39. The potential for jury nullifi-
cation of creditor claims was amply demonstrated by juries in the federal trial courts
in the 1790s, as I will relate in a future article.
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tion in the [federal] judicial branch'M  Amar completely omits
this story of actual popular American insurgency through the
might of the jury. Indeed, his history of the Bill of Rights
leaves out all the many Anti-Federalist proposals that were not
enacted, thus giving an erroneous story of the degree to which
Madison and the Federalists wanted the kind of state-centered
government of by and for The People demanded by the Anti-
Federalists.47
While Amar seems correct that the amendments which Con-
gress did pass were intended as majoritarian structural safe-
guards for The People against a possibly tyrannous national
government, with the sole exception of the Seventh Amend-
ment, none of them responded to an existing crisis or tried to
solve a matter of great contemporary material dispute. The
Federalists who grudgingly proposed them thought them essen-
tially a necessary symbolic gesture to mollify enough of the
probable majority of citizens who opposed the new government
to enable it to get going. The issue, raised repeatedly by Amar,
of the degree to which Madison was ahead of his time in under-
standing the protection to minorities that would be given by the
Bill of Rightse seems both anachronistic, a tempest in a tea-
pot viewed in a historical context full of crucial political battles
and economic problems having little or nothing to do with ei-
ther demands for structural change or the need for individual
46. AMAR, supra note 4, at 11, 81-118. To do him full justice, Amar's chapter on
the Fourth Amendment, see id. at 64-80, also seems brilliant, cogent, and convincing
as a legalistic analysis.
47. The Anti-Federalist leaders were only slightly more devoted to actual rule by
The People than were the Federalists. As Wood notes, "many Antifederalists, espe-
cially in Virginia, were as socially and intellectually formidable as any Federalist"
and "often possessed wealth . . . equal to that of the Federalists." WOOD, supra note
29, at 484-85.
.. [Such 'aristocrats' as [Richard Henry] Lee or [George] Mason did
not truly represent Antifederalism .... [Tihey could have no real identi-
ty, try as they might, with those for whom they sought to speak....
[M]any of the real Antifederalists, those intimately involved in the demo-
cratic politics of the 1780s . . . , were never clearly heard in the formal
debates of 1787-88.
Id. at 485. During this period, elites confined notions of "The People" to those tradi-
tionally included within British classed notions of social competence, white male citi-
zens of property; though, other persons were beginning to imagine themselves as
responsible members of society too. See generally NASH, supra note 2. "The People"
was then, as it is now, a contested notion.
48. See AMMI, supra note 4, at 22, 77, 79 n.*, 159-60, 268.
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or minority protection,49 and misleading, since Madison (along
with most of his Federalist cohorts) fully understood that the
new national government itself was designed in good republican
fashion to protect the propertied against depredations by The
People. The essential substantive meaninglessness in actual
legal and social practice of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
until, as Amar cogently shows, they were transmogrified into
protections for individuals and minorities by the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868,5" demonstrates the presentist, legalistic
rather than historical concerns at the core of Amar's originalist
endeavors.
Since Amar is essentially arguing in today's terms to today's
Court, he calls a dispute concerning speech (the controversy in
1798-1800 over the Alien and Sedition Acts) "the new nation's
first constitutional crisis."5 While this was a crucial constitu-
tional crisis and did involve claims of violation of the First
Amendment, no case brought the Sedition Act before the Su-
preme Court, no lower federal judge found it unconstitution-
al,52 and the words of the Constitution played a minimal role
in resolving the crisis, as compared to ordinary political activi-
ty. Much more importantly, several other crises of a constitu-
tional tenor rocked the union before 1800, some of which
reached the Supreme Court for opinion.5" Given the shaky ac-
ceptance both of the Constitution and of the nation itself in the
1790s, every crisis was a constitutional crisis. To call the Sedi-
tion Act crisis "the first" can only serve modern, legalistic, elite
notions of word-centered constitutional debate and make the
Bill of Rights more important than it was in the 1790s.'
49. See generally WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPuB-
LIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1995); STEWART
JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997).
50. Even then, as is well known, individuals and minorities received little pro-
tection from the Reconstruction amendments, while, paradoxically, corporations availed
themselves of protections the federal courts offered through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Even when apparently intended otherwise, property is protected by major con-
stitutional change.
51. AMAR, supra note 4, at 6.
52. Amar recognizes this fact. See id. at 103.
53. See, e.g., CASTO, supra note 49, at 74-87, 98-105, 139-41, 175-78, 188-97, 213-
46; Wythe Holt, "The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All Who Fear Their Influence
on State Objects": The Failure to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in the Judi-
ciary Acts of 1792 and 1793, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 322-24 (1987).
54. It also serves Amar's presentist concerns for him flatly to proclaim that "there
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Unless law is put into its historical and political vortex of
origin and effect, it is meaningless. Amar's history is an idealis-
tic essay for our time, a challenge to raise the consciousnesses
of an increasingly right-wing Court and a vociferous stable of
laissez-faire jurisprudes, in order to provide more protection to
what right-wingers unkindly think of as the pointy-headed
strangely-colored lesser folk, the sexual misfits and women's
libbers and treehuggers, the ungrateful minorities and pinkos
and lazy welfare moms who clutter the courts and the country
with their demands for political correctness and special protec-
tion. The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction unfortu-
nately does not expect any of these folks, much less these cate-
gories of folks, to make the appropriate changes. Rather, law-
yers, judges, legislators, and other important people will do the
job, the changes will all be to laws and constitutions rather
than to underlying social and economic conditions, and justice
will thereby somehow be served.
It is striking and crucial that workers are never mentioned
among those Amar wishes to protect. We workers are a distinct
majority, not a minority, and our insurgencies implicate the
economic foundations of the capitalist republic. As with most
progressives, Amar does not seem to want to deal with-nor,
perhaps, to provoke-our sort of popular insurgency. His inat-
tention to the interests and insurgencies of ordinary American
working folk, his apparent unwillingness to accord regular peo-
ple a place (much less a prime place) in the making and re-
making of history, renders much less effective his otherwise
laudable effort.
From the perspective of The real People, a different, more
sanguine view of the Bill of Rights emerges: its continued inef-
fectiveness. It seems only the propagation of a national myth to
urge that civil liberties receive something like their due, though
is no such thing as a federal common law of crimes," AMAR, supra note 4, at 102
(emphasis added), as though there never has been such and the matter was settled
at the beginning, when the evidence clearly shows that many persons in the Found-
ing Period thought that the Constitution provided for, or even mandated, a federal
common law of crimes. See John D. Gordan III, United States v. Joseph Ravara:
'Presumptuous Evidence," "Too Many Lawyers," and a Federal Common Law Crime,
in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, 106
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1992); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One &
Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1003, 1231 (1985).
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the myth has been given some credence by the partial successes
of recent popular insurgencies like the Civil Rights Movement,
the Feminist Movement, the Antiwar Movement of the 1960s
and 1970s, the Environmental Movement, and Gay Liberation;
by some notorious cases decided in a progressive fashion by the
Stone, Vinson, and Warren Courts; and by national rhetoric
during a vicious Cold War against supposedly egalitarian social-
ist enemies who loudly propagandized that American devotion
to the Bill of Rights was largely mythological. It is difficult to
cite any important evidence that there is real protection for
revolutionary dissenters under the First Amendment, or that
the Fourth Amendment provides much real protection against
the police,' or that striking, or unionizing, or even working
workers can claim any sort of real legal protection against the
powerful companies which beset them.
Given existing and growing power and wealth imbalances, it
is difficult to perceive that the republican form of government
guaranteed to us by Article IV of the original Constitution, or a
democracy of The People (as Amar's story would have it), exists
now, or is on any foreseeable horizon without systemic change.
Popular insurgency, genteel or not, is the only thing that will
alter this sad state of affairs. Amar's paean to individual liber-
ties, minority rights, and popular governance may raise some
consciousnesses and is surely a step in the right direction, but
since his thinking and his history erase The People from the
history of insurgency and from intellectual discourse as folks
who can act and think, it is only a step. Since Amar is, like
myself, a worker as well as a researcher, he may wish to recast
his work and his lot with We The People, thereby aiding us all
to take a giant leap forward.
55. The police are, my friend L.H. LaRue has convinced me, the very standing
army of mercenaries against which our Founders cogently warned us.
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